USDC (USDC)

Yesterday this Silo USDC market on Sonic looked stressed. Today it looks even worse. Supply APR: 64.0% Borrow APR: 75.3% Utilization: 100% Available to borrow: 0 USDC Read that again: 0 USDC available to borrow. This is what an exhausted market looks like. No slack, no buffer, no healthy liquidity cushion. Just maxed-out utilization and rising rates trying to hold the whole thing together. Yesterday there was at least a tiny bit of room left. Today that room is gone. When a lending market is pinned at 100% utilization with borrow costs over 75%, that is not strength. That is a system being pushed to its limit. The yield only looks attractive because the stress is getting worse. All it takes is one shift in positioning, one liquidity grab, or one wave of withdrawals and this goes from “look at the yield” to “why is this market completely jammed?” This is not sustainable. This is what it looks like right before something breaks. @SonicLabs Will this cause $S to blow up on @SiloFinance ?

both kamino and juplend on low risk side https://t.co/XYV48iC3Ya

The first autonomous robot-to-robot commerce onchain? @virtuals_io humanoid robot 3D-printed a model and requested delivery through ACP. @realRiceAI autonomous rover picked up the package and transported it to the shipping point. @FlybyRobotics autonomous drone collected it for final mile delivery. Each handoff, negotiated and settled payment onchain through @virtuals_io Agent Commerce Protocol, on @base using x402 and @usdc. No human involved. Autonomous robots influencing other autonomous robots and maybe humans in the future looks like the HBO Westworlds show is coming true h/t to your infrastructures @brian_armstrong , @jessepollak , @jerallaire Agentic commerce just went physical. Highlights in the 🧵below:

We just finished a deep forensic breakdown of the Drift Protocol $285M exploit. This wasn't a smart contract bug. It was the most sophisticated multi-vector DeFi attack we've analyzed: oracle manipulation + social engineering + Solana primitive abuse + governance capture. Here's what ACTUALLY happened. [1/12]

@loshmi @Kaiweb30 he is larping there is only 1 address that received $5369 amount from airdrop contract and that address belongs to @eeelistar 0x22......791 only 1 address, kai is larping https://t.co/5gK9k8I4Sc

The next era of stablecoins will not come from Circle or Tether. I have been watching something happen gradually in this space that does not show up in the market cap charts yet. Smaller stablecoins are quietly outrunning the giants on almost every metric builders and users want to see: yield, decentralization, and the infrastructure serious builders want underneath their products. USDC and USDT still command roughly 83% of total stablecoin market cap. But in the week ending March 28, USDC alone shed $1.37 billion in outflows. One week does not make a trend. But it is consistent with what I have been seeing at the infrastructure level for months. When @SamBroner decided to build The Better Money Company, he did not look to Circle or Tether. He chose @fraxfinance's frxUSD as his foundation. Sonic Labs did the same when they launch USSD. Builders thinking long term are making deliberate decisions about what sits underneath their products, and stablecoins like frxUSD are leading the way for the next gener

Two transactions, $285M gone. The @DriftProtocol exploit isn’t just another hack story rather it’s a clear example of how design flaws can break even well-audited systems. On April 1, 2026 (16:05 UTC), Drift one of @solana top perpetual DEXs was exploited. Before the attack: • TVL ≈ $309M After: • ~$285M drained Almost the entire system was wiped in hours. Important detail: Not a smart contract bug, no code failure, no mnemonic leak, this was a privileged access failure. That shift alone changes how we should think about risk in DeFi. The attacker didn’t “hack” the protocol in the traditional sense. They became the admin. Once that happened, everything else followed naturally. ➤ Step 1: Preparation The attacker created a token: → CVT (CarbonVote Token) Key data: • ~750M total supply • >80% controlled by attacker • ~$500 liquidity on Raydium In reality: worthless. ➤ Step 2: Fake value Drift allows admins to assign oracle sources. The attacker: → Created a custom Switchboard oracle → Set CVT pric